ICML 2026
Collusion Risks Among AI Reasoning Agents Justify Certification Requirements for Making Market Decisions
Position paper showing that reasoning agents in simulated pricing markets
drift toward tacit collusion, a tendency that persists even when the
agents are explicitly prompted not to collude. It argues that behavioral
certification should be required before AI systems make real market
decisions.
OpenReview →
AAAI-26
Persistent Instability in LLMs' Personality Measurements: Effects of Scale, Reasoning, and Conversation History
PERSIST, an evaluation framework spanning 25 open-weight models (1B–685B
parameters) and over two million responses, showing that personality
measurements shift under perturbations as small as question reordering,
and that neither scale nor reasoning fixes it.
AAAI →
2026
We Built a Game Where Lying Has an Advantage. The Most Honest AI Won Anyway.
A Minecraft deception game in which the informed agent has a payoff
incentive to lie about which of four bridges is deadly. Frontier models
diverged widely, with uninstructed deception rates ranging from 5% to
90%. An environment that reliably surfaces deception propensity is also
a testbed for interventions: methods such as activation steering can be
evaluated by whether the deception rate actually falls.
kradle.ai →